Abstract
Introduction
The concept and the use of contracts are not new to today's society. Legal contracts can be traced back to ancient times [1] . There are records that indicate that legal contracts were used by the Mesopotamians circa 2300-428 BC for selling and purchasing slaves, land, crops and for establishing partnerships between two or more landowners.
Since hard-copy contracts have been used for a long time, we know how to write (for example in English), interpret and execute a conventional contract; unfortunately, contracts in the electronic world are not yet well understood. In particular, converting a conventional contract into an executable contract is not a trivial process.
A conventional contract can be defined as a document that stipulates that its signatories (two or more) agree to observe the clauses stipulated in the document.
An executable contract (x-contract) is the electronic version of a conventional contract and consists of one or more executable files complemented with zero or more ancillary files (text, graphics, images, etc.), that can be enacted to enforce what the English text contract stipulates.
In order to implement an x-contract, the conventional contract has to be described in a formal notation and checked for correctness. We have found that Finite State Machines are quite adequate for describing contracts, and for verifying their correctness properties.
The problem we are investigating can be described as follows: given a conventional contract, how can it be described by FSMs? We are not investigating how to negotiate contracts over the Internet; we assume that the contract already exists. Our goal is to express it in FSMs, possibly, after editing the original text to correct ambiguities. Another aspect we investigate is what runtime infrastructure is required for monitoring and enforcement of x-contracts.
Rights and obligations in a contract
Each entry in a contract is called a term or a clause. The clauses of a contract stipulate how the signing parties are expected to behave. In other words, they list the rights and obligations of each signing party.
A right is an action that a signing entity can do if it wishes to. For example, a contract might stipulate that Alice, as a manager of enterprise E1, has the right to send an offer to sell to Bob, the manager of enterprise E2.
Because this is a right, it is up to Alice to send or not to send the offer to Bob; Bob need not be disappointed if he does not receive the offer. Similarly, an obligation can be defined as a duty that an entity is expected to perform.
A failure to perform such a duty means a breach of the contract. For example, a contract might stipulate that upon receiving an offer to sell from Alice, Bob has the obligation to reply to her with an OfferAccepted or OfferRejected message.
The rights and obligations stipulated in a contract can be abstracted and grouped into a set of Rights (R) and a set of Obligations (O). Let , respectively. The sets R and O indicate that the manager of enterprise E1 has agreed to honour m rights and p obligations. Similarly, the manager of enterprise E2 has agreed to honour n rights and q obligations. We assume that m, n, p and q are integers and equal or greater than zero. For example, R 1 ME1 is a right expected to be honoured by the manager of enterprise E1, whereas R 1
ME2
is a right expected to be honoured by the manager of enterprise E2. Obviously, for a contract to make sense it should have at least one right or one obligation. Note that for the sake of simplicity, in this paper we discuss examples of contracts with only two contracting parties. However, all our concepts, models, and examples can be generalised to n parties as long as n is finite. Note that the execution of a right or an obligation such as SendOfferAccepted will, at a lower level of abstraction, demand access to one or more objects such as files, databases and printers. A question that arises here is whether Alice and Bob have the right to access the objects affected by their operations. This is an issue of authentication and access control and falls out of the scope of this paper. We believe that at object level, rights to access resources can be implemented using Role-Based Access Control mechanisms [2] . is the output function. Informally, M describes an abstract system that stays in a given state until it receives an external stimulus.
Description of contracts using FSMs

Contracts as FSMs
When such stimulus is received, the system reacts by doing something (for example, sending an output signal) and then moves to a different state. Note that do something might mean do nothing in some circumstances and that the new state is not necessarily different from the previous. The behaviour of this abstract system matches the behaviour of a business contract. At a given time a contract can be at any of n possible states (states 1 , state 2 It follows that a contract can be represented as a set of FSMs, one for each contracting party, that interact with each other. The physical location of each FSM is irrelevant to the functionality of the contract and is decided at the time of implementation. Conceptually, we can assume that a FSM is located within each contracting party and that these FSMs communicate with each other through communication channels.
A simple example
To show what rights and obligations look like, we will discuss a very simple example of a contract for offering and purchasing goods remotely, for example, over the Internet. The x-contract which is signed by a purchaser and a supplier contains, amongst other data, the following clauses: 
Omissions and inconsistencies
The example contract discussed here is quite brief and looks correct at a first glance, however, as an attentive reader would have noticed, it contains liveness omissions. The contract text does not specify the duration within which to send an offer. Neither does it specify the duration within which the notification about rejecting or accepting the offer should be sent. The x-contract can still be implemented and enacted but the purchaser's FSM will hang silently until the supplier decides to send an offer. If for some reason the supplier forgets to send his offer, the two FSMs will hang silently forever or until the purchaser or the supplier use another channel (for example a telephone) to investigate the problem.
We believe that the existence of inconsistencies in conventional standard contracts is normal rather than exceptional. However, in x-contracts they need to be eliminated. This is where the advantage of representing contracts by means of FSM becomes apparent.
A contract represented as FSMs can be validated using the model checking tools (for example Spin [3] A model checker should verify not only that a contract reaches an end-state with all the participating parties, but also it should verify that it does not reach unacceptable states. For example, it should detect if the contract allows the purchaser to receive an item before paying for it or the supplier double-charging the purchaser.
It is reasonable to expect that most conventional contract suffer from several ambiguities. Because of this, converting a contract into its x-contract is not a trivial but a long and interactive process between the writer of the English text contract (for example, a lawyer) and the technical person in charge of the implementation of the xcontract. The technical person would receive the English text contract from the lawyer, convert it into FSMs and check it for ambiguities. Detection of ambiguities would mean bouncing the contract back to the lawyer for correction. Only when both the lawyer and the technical person agree about the content of the English text contract and its correctness, the technical person proceeds with its implementation.
Contract templates
In the business world, there is a family of applications where the contracting parties resort to fairly standardized contract templates which are offered ready to be filled in and signed. Examples of these templates are tenant agreements. They are offered on the take-it-or-leave-it basis since the clauses of the contract are not negotiable. The contracting parties can negotiate the data to be written in the blanks, but nothing else.
We believe that for this family of applications it is possible to offer, possibly in return for a fee, ready to fill in and sign x-contracts. We can think of a Web place where standard English text templates are stored together with their x-contracts. Remotely contracting parties can then fill in the template that suit their requirements, sign it, pay for the service, plug it in their applications and enact the x-contract.
Monitoring and enforcement
To reason about how the contractual rights and obligations can be monitored and enforced by FSMs, it is useful to look at the rights and obligations a contracting party has in a given state of the execution of the xcontract. In terms of FSMs, this is equivalent to looking at the set of operations that can be executed when the FSM of the contractual party is in state q . It is useful to classify this set into two subsets: the subset of operations the owner of the FSM has the right to perform and the subset of operations that person has the obligation to perform, } ,..., , { We consider an example involving a purchaser and a supplier. Let us say, the execution of the x-contract at the purchaser's side is in state state q (see Fig. 4 With appropriate support from the underlying middleware (see the next section), each FSM can be used to monitor and enforce the rights and obligations of its owner. Thus the supplier's FSM will allow the supplier to execute only the operations he has the right to execute and nothing else. Likewise, the FSM enforces the supplier to execute the operations he has the obligation to execute. The purchaser's FSM works in a similar way.
Middleware support
Next we investigate what middleware services are required to support a contract management system that guarantees that the rights and obligations stipulated in the contract are monitored and enforced. We are assuming that the organizations involved might not trust each other, so an important requirement from the middleware is that it should enable regulated interactions (as encoded in xcontract) between two or more mutually distrusting but autonomous organizations. It is clearly not possible to prevent organisations from misbehaving and attempting to cheat on their agreed contractual relationships. The best that can be achieved is to ensure that all contractual interactions between such organisations are funnelled through (a centralised or distributed) contract management system and that all other non-contractual interactions are disallowed.
We assume that each organization has a local set of policies for business interactions that is consistent with the overall business interaction rules encoded in the form of rights and obligations in the x-contract. Then, the safety property of the contract management system should ensure that local policies of an organization are not compromised despite failures and/or misbehavior by other parties; whilst the liveness property should ensure that if all the parties are correct (not misbehaving), then agreed interactions would take place despite a bounded number of temporary network and computer related failures.
Given the above observations, we can state that organizations will require (i) that their own actions meet locally determined policies; and that these actions are acknowledged and accepted by other parties; and (ii) that the actions of other parties comply with agreed rules and are irrefutably attributable to those parties. These requirements imply the collection, and verification, of non-repudiable evidence of the actions of parties who interact with each other.
For non-repudiable information sharing we propose to use the B2BObject middleware developed by us [4] .
Assume that every organization has a copy of some shared information encoded in objects, then B2Bobjects middleware provides non-repudiable coordination of the state of object replicas. State changes are subject to a locally evaluated validation process. State validation is application-specific and may be arbitrarily complex (and may involve back-end processes at each organisation).
Coordination protocols provide multi-party agreement on access to and validation of state. Fig. 5 presents four  enterprises (E1, E2, E3, E4) , sharing a state through three B2BObjects (A, B, and C). As shown in the figure, the logical view of shared objects in a virtual space (a) is realised by the regulated coordination of actions on object replicas held at each organisation (b). Multi-party validation of state changes supports the notion of "joint ownership" of shared state. A state change proposal comprises the new state and the proposer's signature on that state. The proposal is dispatched to all other parties for local validation. Each recipient produces a response comprising a signed receipt and a signed decision on the (local) validity of the state change. All parties receive each response and a new state is valid if the collective decision is unanimous agreement to the change. The signing of evidence generated during state validation binds the evidence to the relevant keyholder. Evidence is stored systematically in local nonrepudiation logs. The B2BObjects middleware provides both the liveness and safety properties stated earlier.
With this background, we can hint at the overall implementation of an x-contract. The implementation of a x-contract that involves a purchaser and a supplier, is shown in Fig 6. Each party maintains a copy of the contract object, encoded as one or more B2BObjects (B2Bobj); operations on these objects are controlled by the contract FSMs. The dashed line that goes from the supplier to the purchaser shows what happens when the supplier sends an offer. When the offer is ready, the supplier invokes a send operation, and the supplier's FSM switches to its Waiting for response state and makes a SendOffer call to the local copy of a shared B2Bobj (that implements the operation). The local B2Bobj collects, and signs, evidence of the operation and requests coordination of the proposed update to its state with the purchaser's B2Bobj.
The purchaser's B2Bobj verifies the evidence provided and makes an up-call to the purchaser's FSM to validate the B2Bobj operation. Upon receiving the up-call, the purchaser's FSM switches to the Deciding to buy state.
The dashed line from the purchaser's FSM to the supplier's FSM shows how the purchaser's response is transmitted to the supplier. The B2BObjects middleware ensures that all operations performed by the purchaser and the supplier are recorded and are non-repudiable. One of the major advantages of B2BObjects is that it ensures this without the need of involving centralized trusted third parties. Contract management must be made part of the business processes of the organizations involved. An organization's business processes can be divided into two broad categories. The business processes that are internal to the organization and the 'contract management processes' that involve interactions with trading partners. A difficult problem is that of coordinating multiple workflows in a decentralised manner. Most commercial workflow systems are inherently centralised. A way out is to use a workflow system with decentralised coordination (e.g., [5] ) for managing just the inter-organizational workflows. This is left as a topic for further investigation.
Related work
Monitoring and controlling electronic transactions is addressed by Minsky et al in a number of papers on Law Governed Interaction (LGI) [6] .
LGI is an infrastructure that allows members of a group to interact using agents, where agents are entities that interact with each other.
Law enforcement as described in [7] is achieved as follows: the law L is enforced by a set of trusted entities called controllers that mediate the exchange of messages (M) between members of the group of agents (g). For every active member x in g, there is a controller Cx placed between x and the communication medium. Every controller carries the law L. The controller Cx assigned to x computes the ruling of L for every event at x, and the ruling is carried out locally. Controllers act similarly to our FSM based contract enforcer, which enforces the agreed contract, and regulates interactions between the parties.
Another work of relevance to contract monitoring and enforcement is the Ponder Policy Specification Language [8] . Ponder is an object-oriented declarative language for specifying management and security policies for distributed systems. It can specify, monitor and enforce what actions (operations on objects) are permitted within a system, who can invoke the actions and under which conditions. Ponder comes with a toolkit for editing, compiling and managing policies, that can be downloaded from its Web page at the Department of Computer Science of the Imperial College in London. Ponder was designed to govern actions executed within a single system, it is not clear to us whether its semantic is descriptive enough to regulate tight interactions between two or more independent business partners.
The idea of monitoring and enforcement of policies specifically for electronic contracts has been discussed by Milosovic et al [9] [10] [11] . In [11] , "A possible sequence of contract operations" is proposed. These include the "Establishment Phase" where the parties negotiate the terms of the contract and sign it, and the "Performance Phase", where the contract is monitored and enforced. The proposal assumes in an implicit way the participation of third parties for minitoring and enforcement. In [9] , the authors pay particular attention to the benefits of using standard contracts, a concept that is also important in our work. The B2B model they introduce has the following key elements: The main difference between the above formulation of policy and our design is that using B2BObjects, our implementation does not require a trusted third party for monitoring and enforcing. Monitoring and enforcing is done by the parties to the contract themselves.
Research described in [12] discusses contract representation and enforcement using occurrences. An occurrence is basically an event. Contracts are stored in an occurrence store. Workflow occurrences are also stored there, and a collection of stored queries is maintained. Each query describes the occurrences promised and prohibited under the provisions of the contracts and policies of an organisation. [13] also proposes a mechanism that discovers inconsistencies between business contracts and organisational policies.
Work that considers state representation of contracts is introduced in [14] and [15] . In [15] an informal schematic notation for electronic contracts is introduced. It can be used to summarize the structure of agreements as collections of interrelated obligations. However formal semantics had not been developed for the notation. In [15] , the authors present a simple architecture for an e-market where a controller agent is used to undertake the resolution of possible disputes between parties to an agreement. The controller may hold a representation of a contract in a model language, which implicitly defines state spaces. Also the representation is accessible to each party so that each party knows what it is supposed to do, and what to expect from its counter party.
The controller in this architecture acts as a judge, using information from the contract, and other sources such as advisors for the resolution of disputes. This is a different line of research to ours, as we concentrate explicitly on using Finite State Machines to represent contracts, and enforce them. Any disputes that arise in our case are not currently addressed by our research.
Concluding Remarks
Converting an existing standard contract written in English or other human languages into an x-contract is a challenging yet achievable task. The result of the task should be a computer program that, when executed, performs, monitors and enforces the business operations stipulated in the original human oriented document. The ambiguities that are normally present in human oriented contracts make the conversion a difficult process aimed at correcting such ambiguities without changing the main goal of the original text contract. To find ambiguities in the text contract it is strongly advisable to convert it into formal notation.
In this paper, we have shown how finite state machines can be used as a formal notation when it comes to converting text contracts into x-contracts. We have found that a finite state machine is a simple yet expressive model for describing, validating and implementing xcontracts. We have illustrated our ideas with the help of a simple example. A more realistic example is discussed in the extended version of the paper [16] ; this example has not been included here to save space.
In our ongoing work we are in the process of implementing x-contracts on top of the B2BObjects middleware service. B2BObjects is used to regulate the interaction between the contracting parties and to collect non-repudiable evidence of each of their actions. Using B2BObjects we can show that x-contracts can be monitored and enforced without requiring the involvement of independent trusted third parties.
We are aware that some contract clauses are easier to express in terms of prohibitions rather than rights and obligations. However, we recommend that contracts should be described only in terms of right and obligations and resist the temptation of including the concept of prohibitions simply because it is easier to describe what must be done rather than what cannot be done. We believe that the concepts of rights and obligations are expressive enough to describe whatever the contracting parties wish to stipulate in their contracts.
